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 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-25 15:37 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 作者 于 2006-2-25 15:40:44 编辑


The tradition of existential-phenomenological psychology is derived from the rich heritage of existentialist and phenomenological philosophy. For a review of existential-phenomenology, please see my existential-phenomenology page, also at Mythos & Logos. In many ways, existential-phenomenology, as a reaction to the modern Cartesian paradigm in which psychology is conceived as a natural science, has its roots in a tradition which stretches back to the pre-Socratic Greeks. The movement of existentialism itself erupts with Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel's rationalism, while phenomenology finds its roots in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. The marriage of existentialism and phenomenology was realized in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Existential-phenomenology has to offer a radical criticism of psychology as a natural science paradigm, and, instead, argues that psychology is fundamentally a human science. Its insights are only now beginning to have a profound impact in the psychoanalytic community, but the roots of existentialism predate psychoanalysis (in fact, in many ways, also predicts the emergence of depth psychology). It is a tradition as rich, if not richer, than psychoanalytic thought itself, and, although historically the two traditions have often been at odds, I feel that the two traditions have much to offer to one another, as I have attempted to show in my own work. It should also be mentioned that the "third force" of humanistic psychology ultimately has its roots in this tradition, as well, though the "third force" psychologists often misunderstood the difficult philosophies which influenced them.

While existentialism as a movement emerged in the 20th century, modern existentialism is often first located as derived from the literary tradition of Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821-1881), as well as Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). One could say the same for Freud and psychoanalysis, incidently. Modern existentialism fully emerged with the thought of Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) as a reaction to German rationalism, Hegel in particular. Kierkegaard challenged the people of his day to again take up their faith by holding that faith holds primacy over reason. Existence, for Kiekegaard, can never be fully expressed by reason, and, in fact, is distorted by it. Rather, lived experience, for Kierkegaard, is primary. Similarly, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) served as a precursor to the existentialist movement as an advocate for the human sciences as an alternative to the natural science model.


存在主义-现象心理学这一传统来源于存在主义与现象学哲学的丰富遗产。如果要回顾存在主义-现象学,请见我的《神话与逻各斯》(《Mythos & Logos》)中存在主义-现象学这一页。作为对现代笛卡尔范式(认为心理学是自然科学)的回应,存在主义现象学在许多方面可以在前苏格拉底希腊文化中找到其根源。存在主义运动本身爆发了齐克果(Kierkegaard)对黑格尔理性主义的批判,而现象学可以在埃德蒙特·胡塞尔(Edmund Husserl)的哲学里找到其根源。而在马丁·海德格尔(Martin Heidegger)的哲学体系中实现了对存在主义与现象学的合并。存在主义-现象学不得不对作为自然科学的心理学进行了根本批判,而相反,它提出心理学从根本上来说是一门人文科学。其观点直到现在才开始对心理分析领域产生深远影响,而存在主义的根源是先于精神分析的(事实上,在许多方面,也预示深层心理学的出现)。存在主义-现象心理学即使不比精神分析思想本身更有意义,也与它具有同样重要的意义。而且,尽管从历史上来说这两个传统一直存在意见冲突,但我认为它们都为对方提供了许多可以借鉴的东西,正如在我自己的工作中我一直努力证明的那样。另外,还应该提到的是,作为“第三势力”的人本主义心理学最终也能在存在主义-现象学中找到其根源,尽管“第三势力”的心理学家们经常会对那些影响他们的难以理解的哲学产生误解。

当存在主义作为一项运动出现于20世纪时,现代存在主义最初通常被人们认为除了来源于弗里德里希·尼采(Friedrich Nietzsche,1844-1900)以外,还来源于陀思妥耶夫斯基(Fyodor Dostoyevsky,1821-1881)的文学传统。也许当人们讲到弗洛伊德及其精神分析时,偶尔也会这样说。现代存在主义完全出现于齐克果(Soren Kierkegaard,1813-1855)的思想中,作为对德国理性主义的回应,特别是黑格尔的。齐克果向同时代的人们发起挑战,通过坚信信仰是排在第一位的,是位于理智之上的,从而使人们重拾信仰。对他来说,存在从来不能完全通过理智来表达,而事实上,它是被理智歪曲了。相反,对他来说,生活体验才是第一位的。同样,由于威廉·狄尔泰(Wilhelm Dilthey,1833-1911)因提倡存在主义是人文科学,而被认为是存在主义运动的先驱。

It is a mistake to view existentialism as a coherent theoretical system; rather, it consists of a body of related doctrines which assert a general premise of human existence. From Latin, "existence" means "to stand out." That is, the human being is not an object among objects, but rather a being whose existence involves a "standing out" in a meaningful world. In this sense, existentialists share a fundamental protest against the displacement of individual consciousness from the center of life's stage by a depersonalized nature, a transcendent deity, and/or the collectivized state. From Galileo through Descartes and finally with Newtonian physics, the world became mechanized and, with it, so did the human being. Descartes promised that human beings would be masters and possessors of nature, but, paradoxically, the mathematization of nature turned round with a vengeance upon the human being locked in the subjectivity of Descartes' cogito. The results included the disasters of the early 20th century: two brutish world wars, depression, Stalinism, fascism, and the most absurd and horrible of them all, the Nazi holocaust. Auschwitz stands today as a symbol of the world gone mad in the name of 'progress.' It is existentialism which has come to stand for a fundamental protest against the mechanization of nature, the bureaucratization of the human world, and the death of God. In the face of such horrors, existentialism cries out a vital "NO!" and demands an end to the madness. Where advanced industrialism had stressed the static, the abstract, the objective, the logically rational and unambiguous and the dispassionate universalism of systems detached from the knower, existentialists stressed the dynamic, the concrete, the inter-subjective, consensually validated experiences however ambiguous, and the passionate uniqueness of the engaged participant.

Existentialism, then, as a 20th century movement, from Kierkegaard to Camus, had already anticipated Freud with a brilliant exploration of psychological inwardness. While the human being identifies with universal objective systems which have promised Truth, our personal sense of certitude has crumbled. Identifying with 'the crowd,' we feel infinite and yet at the same time we are cut off from our finitude, since we alone can die our own death. In the Kierkegaardian sense, the human being is severed between two worlds, animal and spiritual, and this contradiction at the heart of our nature leaves us with a hope which requires a "leap of faith" across the abyss which divides one from the other. To accept the "absurd" opposition at the center of being is to know dread or anxiety and the sheer ambiguity of our powerlessness to remove this dread. We must live with the perpetual tension of "the infinite expanding factor of the self" struggling with "the finite limiting factors of the self," for "without dread there is only dogmatics." "Dread is the dizziness of freedom" which "gazes down into its own possibility, grasping its finiteness to sustain itself." It follows that freedom is as great as one's tolerance for ambiguity and anxiety. This condition, for Kierkegaard, leads him to subordinate human relationships, sacrificing his own engagement in order to more nearly approach God, who alone could resolve the rending of his soul.

将存在主义视为一种连续的理论体系是错误的;相反,它是由一组相关学说(声称全面预测了人的存在)构成的。“存在”在拉丁文中的意思是“突出来”("to stand out")。也就是说,人类不是一种物体,而更可能是一种存在,这个存在包含在有意义的世界中“突出来”。在这个意义上,存在主义者共同发表了一项重要声明,反对在生命的重要阶段以失去了个性的性格、先验的神性与(或)集体化的状态替代个人意识。从伽利略到笛卡尔,最后到牛顿的物理学,这个世界变得越来越机械化,而与此相应的是人也越来越机械化了。笛卡尔预言,人将是个性的主人,是个性的所有者。然而,荒谬的是,对自然的数字化处理急剧地转向了对被禁固在笛卡尔的“我思”的主观性的人复仇上。结果就导致了20世纪初的灾难:两次残酷的世界大战、经济萧条、斯大林主义、法西斯主义。而其中最荒谬、最令人恐怖的就是纳粹大屠杀。奥斯威辛(Auschwitz)至今仍被视为在‘进步’的旗号下变得疯狂的世界的一个象征。正是存在主义开始支持反对自然的数字化、人类世界的机构化、上帝死亡这一重要声明的。面对这些恐怖事件,存在主义大喊“不!”,这是至关重要的,并且要求结束疯狂的行为。在先进的工业主义强调静态、抽象、客体、逻辑合理和明确,以及强调与认识者脱离的冷静的普遍主义体系的地方,存在主义者则强调动态、具体、互为主体、双方有效的体验,以及参与者不明确又非常热情的独特性。

 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-25 15:43 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 作者 于 2006-2-25 15:45:00 编辑

Unlike Kierkegaard, Albert Camus (1913-1960) believed that one must live without appeal to God. "I will always refuse to love a creation in which children are tortured," he said. Absurdity lay in the human being's relationship to the universe, the yearning for justice and unity amid palpable injustice and fragmentation and "the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart." Said Camus: "History appears to be in the grip of blind and deaf forces which will heed neither cries of warning, nor advice, nor entreaties. The years we have gone through have killed...the old confidence man had in himself, which lead him to believe that he could always elicit human reactions from another man if he spoke to him in the language of common humanity. We have seen men lie, degrade, kill, deport, torture -- and each time it was not possible to persuade them not to do these things because they were sure of themselves and because one cannot appeal to an abstraction, i.e., the representative of an ideology."

Ideological abstractions in polarized conflict were what Camus most abhorred. The real struggle of life was to break through and sustain others with an authentic understanding. His hero was Sisyphus, the Titan condemned by Zeus to roll a rock forever up a hill. It is in the process of struggle, without tangible rewards, that the human being affirms himself. It is a rebellion that snatches meaning from "the whirlpool's shrieking face." Yet the later Camus found in the process of human dialogue a morality "which, far from obeying abstract principles, discovers them only in the heal of the battle and in the incessant movement of contradiction." From Kierkegaard through Camus, anxiety and dread is a central theme for the existentialist. This theme continues in the work of the existentialist theologian, Paul Tillich, whose work influenced the American existentialist, Rollo May (1909-1994). May also introduced existentialism to American audiences, along with Ernest Angel and Henri F. Ellenberger, with the volume of collected essays, Existence, first published in 1958.

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) is one of the most well-known existentialists of the 20th century. Through his various mediums, including novels, plays and philosophical essays, Sartre asserted and demonstrated his basic view that existence precedes essence. Sartre's existentialist philosophy stands in contradistinction from the Aristotelian and Scholastic assertion that human existence is an expression of a general, metaphysical essence of being. Instead, Sartre insisted that existence defines the essence of the individual. The individual, thus, is what he or she does. The human being, then, is condemned to freedom and has no choice but to choose -- and to choose responsibly. Any denial of such radical freedom at the heart of existence for Sartre is "bad faith." Sartre forcefully -- and perhaps unfairly -- criticized Freud's argument for the existence of the unconscious. For Sartre, there can be no unconscious since one cannot consciously posit the existence of an unconscious, which, by definition, is outside of consciousness.

和齐克果不同,加缪(Albert Camus,1913-1960)认为,人必须在不请求上帝的情况下生存。“我会永远拒绝爱上一个孩子受到折磨的的世界”,他说。谬论就存在于人类与宇宙的关系中,存在于在明显不公平与分裂中渴望公平与统一,以及“狂热地渴望人内心明确地回应”。加缪说:“历史好像紧紧抓住盲目的势力,这些势力从来不会留意战争的哭喊、不会留意建议、不会听到恳求。我们经历的这些年已经杀了……有信心的老人已经成为了他自己,这使他相信,如果他用普遍人性化的语言和人说话,他也许总能引起他人的回应。我们一直都能看到人撒谎、堕落、杀戮、驱逐、折磨。而每次都不可能说服他们不做这样的事情,因为他们对自己相当有把握,又因为人们不可能请求抽象的东西(如意识形态的代表)”。

在极端冲突中的意识形态抽象概念是加缪最痛恨的。真正的生活斗争应该是通过可信的谅解修通并维持与他人的关系。他的英雄是被宙斯惩罚永远将一块巨石推向山顶的太阳神西西弗斯(希腊君王)。就是在斗争的过程中,如果没有切实的奖赏,人类也能证实自己。正是反抗才从“混乱的尖叫的表情上”获取了意义。然而后来,加缪在人类对话的过程中发现了一种道德,即“这一道德远远不是服从抽象的法则,他们只是处于治愈战争、处于永不停息的矛盾运动中”。从齐克果到加缪,焦虑和恐惧都是存在主义者的主要主题。这一主题一直持续到存在主义神学家保罗·蒂利希(Paul Tillich)的成果中,他的成果对美国存在主义者罗洛·梅(Rollo May,1909-1994)造成了影响。梅还与Ernest Angel、Henri F. Ellenberger一起,通过《存在主义》(收集的论文合订本,1958年首次出版)这本书,将存在主义介绍给美国听众。

让-保罗·萨特(Jean-Paul Sartre,1905-1980)是20世纪最知名的存在主义者之一。通过各种方式(小说、剧本与哲学杂文),萨特维护并证明了他的基本观点——存在先于本质。他的存在主义哲学与亚里士多德和经院哲学(认为人的存在是对人的普遍、形而上学的本质的表达)不同。相反,萨特认为存在就解释了个体的本质。因而个体就是他(她)所做的事情。那么,人类被宣判自由,除了选择之外别无选择,而且还要负责任地进行选择。对他来说,对存在中的这种基本自由的任何否认都是“坏信念”。萨特激烈地(或许是不公平地)对弗洛伊德的关于潜意识存在的论断进行了批判。对他来说,根本不存在潜意识,因为人们不能够有意识地安置潜意识的存在,因此,潜意识这一定义是超出了意识之外的。

Sartre's philosophy, among others, deeply influenced the thinking of psychiatrist, R. D. Laing, who advanced the existential position of Sartre that persons experience being-for-themselves and seek to enhance this. Existential being refers to a continuous dynamic flow of consciousness-through-action (praxis) which issues from human beings out of their social environments. Yet when we behold others we tend to see them as beings-in-themselves, as objects located in our own purposive vision. For Sartre, interpersonal relationships were a perpetual struggle to assert the fluidity of our own existence against persistent attempts to objectify us by others. Since the "scientific world view" is overwhelmingly objectifying, this view of the detached observor seeks to explain us further by analytic reasoning which reduces us to parts. There is psychological violence in this distant gaze and disintegrative thinking. Sartre opts for his own brand of dialectical reasoning wherein the convictions of any persons or group will be 'depassed,' i.e., encompassed into the larger configuration of another's convictions. No conviction should therefore masquerade as a moral absolute or objective determination. Laing, following Sartre, regards contemporary psychiatry as having made a false objectification of psychic states. Patients seeking help because they feel like dead and shattered objects find themselves further petrified by the viewpoints of psychiatry. The very data which symptoms constitute are in reality capta, pieces torn and abstracted from the fabric of lived existence.

As mentioned above, existentialist psychology and humanism are closely aligned, and humanistic psychology is, in fact, more of an outcrop of the existentialist tradition than the other way around. Maslow was deeply influenced by existentialist philosophy and psychology, for example. Also, Maurice Friedman was responsible for generating a fascinating dialogue between the existentialist philosopher, Martin Buber (1878-1965) and Carl Rogers. Carl Rogers states the following as his "central hypothesis":

"...the individual has within himself or herself vast resources for self-understanding, for altering his or her self-concept, attitudes, and self-directed behavior -- and that these resources can be tapped if only a definable climate of facilitative psychological attitudes can be provided. "

Based on this assumption, Rogers elaborates three conditions for the therapeutic relationship in order for it to inhabit the "definable climate" of which he speaks:

1) "Genuineness, realness, or congruence"

2) "acceptance, or caring, or prizing -- unconditional positive regard"

3) "Empathic understanding"

These conditions define what Rogers calls his "person-" or "client-centered approach" to therapy. This approach is described by Rogers as more a "basic philosophy" than a particular technique or method, which involves a "basic trust in the person" rather than a skeptical or distrustful attitude. Rogers' approach begins with the assumption that human nature is essentially 'good,' that the person shares with all living organisms an "actualizing tendency...to grow, to develop, to realize its full potential." Rogers places himself in contrast to traditional psychotherapy which views the human being as "innately sinful" and, in turn, which involves a skeptical attitude toward the client.

其中,萨特的哲学深深地影响了精神病医师莱恩(R. D. Laing)的思想,他提升了萨特存在主义——人们体验成为自己并且试图增强这一体验——的地位。存在主义的存在指的是意识—行为(实践)的持续动态的流动,它是从人类这里流出,而不是其社会环境。而此时我们会将我们倾向于视为成为了他们自己的他人,看作是定位于我们有目的的视觉之内的客体。对萨特来说,人际关系一种永久的斗争,这种斗争坚持我们自己存在的流动性,而反对他人持续不断地试图将我们客体化。由于“科学的世界观”是极端客观化的,因此这种孤立的观察者的观点试图通过将我们简化为部分的分析推理向我们进行进一步解释。在这种远距离注视及令人崩溃的思想中存在着精神暴力。萨特选择了自己的辩证推理类型,他确信任何个人或团体都会“不被通过”。如,陷入另一更大的信念构架的包围之中。因此没有任何信念应该伪装为道德上绝对/客观的决定。莱恩同意萨特的观点,他将当代的精神病学视为是对精神状态作了错误的客体化。那些感到快要死了并且毁坏了客体而寻求帮助的病人,发现自己被精神病的观点进一步吓呆了。构成症状的真实数据事实上是capta、破碎的眼泪、是从生命存在的建构中抽象出来的。

就像上面提到的那样,存在主义心理学和人本主义是紧密联合的,而事实上,比起其它哲学,人本主义心理学更属于存在主义传统的突出哲学。例如,马斯洛就受到存在主义哲学和心理学的极大影响。另外,莫瑞斯·费德曼(Maurice Friedman)促成了存在主义哲学家马丁·布伯(Martin Buber,1878-1965)和卡尔·罗杰斯(Carl Rogers)之间精彩的对话。卡尔·罗杰斯将下面几项作为他的“重要假设”:







 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-25 15:46 | 显示全部楼层

Friedman's dialogue between Rogers and Buber reveals both similarities and differences between the two thinkers. Buber, for one, is more inclined to view human beings as polar, in distinction from Rogers' trust in the power of "self-actualization" to heal from the 'good' inner core of the person's natural resources. This leads to a fundamental difference between how Rogers and Buber understand the relationship between "acceptance" and "congruence." For Rogers, the terms imply one another, whereas Buber does not equate the two. Buber insists that "confirming a person as he or she is" merely marks the first step in confirming what "in the present lies hidden what can become." In short, it seems that Buber is less inclined than Rogers toward merely trusting in the hypothesized 'goodness' of the person's "self-actualizing" potential to lead the person to this potential.

In support of Buber's distinction, Friedman writes: "Healing does not mean bringing up the old, but rather shaping the new: It is not confirming the negative, but rather counterbalancing with the positive." Buber and Friedman seem to have a good point in that their take on Rogers allows for a darker side to human nature. Buber understands the human being as potentially destructive as well as growth-promoting. Therefore, Buber's viewpoint, as Friedman understands it, considers confirmation a "wrestling with the other against him or her self" in order to strengthen the 'positive' pole as opposed to the 'negative' pole. The question remains, however: Who is to differentiate the 'negative' from the 'positive'?

Theory inevitably implies a system of beliefs which have ethical implications. In the light of Friedman's dialogue with Rogers and Buber, there is clearly such a struggle to reconcile two very similar beliefs systems which contain different assumptions regarding the idea of the nature of the human being. In turn, this implies two potentially different views of the nature of the therapeutic relationship. Yet, can these two views be reconciled?

In support of Rogers, I must say that Buber's idea could potentially lead to a therapeutic relationship in which the therapist becomes the arbiter of 'truth,' the one who decides which pole is 'positive' and which is 'negative,' the one who is 'supposed to know.' This is potentially dangerous, for obvious reasons. Instead, Rogers' view allows for an understanding of the human being as ambivalent without the need to push the client toward any particular direction. Rogers' view allows for a therapeutic relationship in which the therapist and client may share the struggle. On the other hand, Buber's perspective is an attempt to move beyond the often 'pollyanna' humanism of Rogers by seriously considering the possibility of evil. For an attempt to reconcile these two positions, I recommend my own paper:

Reflections on Being a Psychotherapist






Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) was also one of the pioneers in developing an existential psychology. For Jaspers, philosophy involves the inquiry into freedom, history, and the possibility of meaning in existence. Jaspers studied both medicine and law, and eventually joined the staff of a psychiatric hospital in Heidelberg. Jaspers came to the conclusion in his work that there are three stages of being. Being-there, the first stage, is the human being's reference to the external, objective world of reality. The second stage, Being-oneself, is the stage that allows the person self-awareness of choices and decisions. Finally, for Jaspers, the highest stage of existience is Being-in-itself, the attainment of the fullest of meaning involving the transcendental world of individual meaning that encompasses and comprehends the totality of meaning -- the individual is in effective communication with the social and physical environment so that existence is fully defined.

The movement of phenomenology, as it is often stated in History of Psychology texts, greatly influenced the Gestalt psychology movement. Phenomenological psychology, influenced by Edmund Husserl (1959-1938), is characterized by an attempt to move beyond psychology as a natural science and define a method of inquiry for psychology as a human science. Husserl's "transcendental phenomenology" aims to "bracket" or put aside the "natural attitude," one's basic assumptions regarding the nature of reality. It is fundamentally descriptive and, thus, qualitative rather than quantitative. Without prejudgment, bias, or any predetermined set or orientation, the transcendental phenomenologist strives to apprehend the structure of any phenomena which appears through the "eidetic reduction." This involves using "imaginative variation" to capture the essential structure of any phenomena within consciousness. Most importantly, the goal of the phenomenologist is not to manipulate or control the phenomena, but rather to permit the phenomena to reveal itself as it is, including its origins or bases. Using this method, phenomenology attempts to overcome the reductionism and atomism of natural science psychology by providing a method which focuses on the meaning and significance of the phenomena for the experiencing person from the perspective of the whole person. The "Duquesne Group" out of Duquesne University has been known for its attempts to systematize a phenomenological methodology for psychological research which matches the rigour of natural science. Adrian Van Kaam, Amedio Giorgi and Fred Wertz have all greatly contributed to this tradition.

卡尔•雅斯贝尔斯(Karl Jaspers,1883-1969)也是存在主义心理学的先驱之一。对他来说,哲学包含对自由、历史与存在意义的可能性的质询。他学习医学与法律,而最终却成为海德尔堡精神病医院的员工。雅斯贝尔斯在他的工作中逐渐得出结论,即存在有三个阶段。第一个阶段是于彼存在(Being-there),是人相对于存在的参照物、是真实的客观世界。第二个阶段是自我存在(Being-oneself),这一阶段承认人具有选择与决定的自我意识。最后,存在的最高阶段是自体存在(Being-in-itself),这个阶段达到了最充分的意义,包括个体意义——包含并领会了意义的整体性——的先验性,即个体处于与社会和物质环境有效沟通中,因而存在就得到了全面解释。

正如在《心理学历史》教科书中经常提到的那样,现象学运动极大地影响了完型心理学运动。受到了胡塞尔(Edmund Husserl,1959-1938)影响的现象心理学的特点是,努力去除心理学为自然科学,而是将其作为人文科学确定了心理学质询方法。胡塞尔的“先验现象学”旨在“架空”或撇开“自然科学的态度(关于实在本质的一个基本假设)”。它基本上是描述性的,因而它是定性的,而非定量的。如果没有先入为主、偏见或任何预定的设置或方向,那么先验现象学家就会努力领会任何好像穿越了“形相还原” (“eidetic reduction”)的现象结构。这包括利用“想象的变形”(“imaginative variation”)获取意识之内任何现象的本质结构。最重要的是,现象学家的目标不是操纵(或控制)现象,而是让现象以其本来面目呈现,包括它的起源或基础。利用这种方法,现象学通过从整个人的观点,为正在经历的人提供一种方法——集中于现象的意义与重要性上,试图克服自然科学心理学的简化论与个人主义论。Duquesne大学的“Duquesne团体”一直以其努力将心理学研究的现象学方法论进行系统化而知名,这是与自然科学的严格性相一致的。Adrian Van Kaam、Amedio Giorgi及Fred Wertz都对这一传统做出了巨大贡献。
 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-25 15:50 | 显示全部楼层

It is in the early thinking of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) that existentialism and phenomenology are brought together, particularly in Heidegger's magnum opus, Being & Time (1927). Heidegger characterizes Western philosophy as forgetful of the question of Being, which is the central preoccupation of his thought (see the Why page at Mythos & Logos for more information). Heidegger, in turn, argues that it is the human kind of being or Dasein (translated as "there-being") who asks the question of Being; therefore, the human being must already have an implicit understanding of Being. The human kind of being is distinct in that it asks the question of Being, and, as such, the human being can be said to exist and be characterized by existence. "Dasein," writes Heidegger, "always understands itself in terms of its existence -- in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not to be itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already." For a more in depth exploration of Heidegger's thought, see my Heidegger page at Mythos & Logos.

Heidegger's work has been highly influential in the development of existential-phenomenological psychology. Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) is notable as the psychologist who first attempted to integrate the work of Husserl and Heidegger with psychoanalysis. Binswanger was a close colleague of Freud's, and it is remarkable that, considering Binswanger's differences with Freud, his relationship with him endured while other dissenting colleagues, such as Jung, Adler and Rank, were shunned by Freud. The kinship between Freud and Binswanger can likely be attributed to Freud's early influences as a student of Franz Brentano, who was also Husserl's teacher and whose "Act psychology" is a major precursor to the phenomenological movement. Fred Wertz, for example, has researched the remarkable parallels between Freud and Husserl. Influenced by Heidegger, Binswanger termed his approach to psychoanalysis, Daseins-analyse. Binswanger, too, argued that the reductionistic methods of natural science are inadequate for understanding the human being. As a therapist, Binswanger asserted that the psychotherapist must endeavor to apprehend the world of the patient as it is experienced by the patient. Also influenced by Heidegger's philosophy of time, Binswanger emphasized that the therapist should focus on the patient's present experience in therapy, and, while agreeing with Freud's instinct theory, he argued that the past is relevant only in so far as it matters to the patient in the present. Fundamentally, Binswanger was concerned with understanding the present experience of the patient represented in consciousness, and, thus, the aim of analysis is to uncover the structures of phenomena interpreted by each patient's individually defined context of meaning.

正是在马丁·海德格尔(Martin Heidegger,1889-1976)早期的思想里,存在主义与现象学才被集合在一起,特别是在他的代表作《存在与时间》中(1927)。海德格尔将西方哲学描绘成容易忽略存在的问题,这是他的思想主要关注的问题(请见《神话与逻各斯》中“为什么”这一页,以了解更多信息)。他分别提出,正是存在或此在(Dasein)的人类才提出了存在这一问题;因而,人类必定对存在已经有了绝对理解。存在的人是很明显的,因为它问到了存在的问题,而同样,可以说人类存在,而且以存在着为特征。海德格尔写道:“此在(Dasein)总是按照其存在来理解它自己”——按照它本身的一种可能性:成为自己或不成为自己。此在本身或许已经选择了这些可能性,或许使它自己进入到这些可能性中,或者已经在这些可能性中长大成人。”如果要深入探索海德格尔的思想,请看我的《神话与逻各斯》中关于海德格尔这一章。

海德格尔的成果对存在主义-现象心理学具有巨大影响。路德维希·宾斯万格(Ludwig Binswanger,1881-1966)是以最先努力将胡塞尔和海德格尔的心理分析成果进行整合而出名的心理学家。他是弗洛伊德亲密的同事。而值得注意的是,鉴于他与弗洛伊德的不同,当弗洛伊德避开与他持不同意见的人时,却与他继续保持联系。弗洛伊德与宾斯万格之间的密切关系或许可以归功于弗洛伊德早期作为布伦塔诺(也是胡塞尔的老师,而他的“行为心理学”是现象学运动的一个主要先驱)的学生而对他形成的影响。比如,Fred Wertz就对弗洛伊德与胡塞尔之间显著的相似之处进行了研究。受海德格尔的影响,宾斯万格将他的心理分析方法称做是此在分析(Daseins-analyse)。他还提出,自然科学的一些简约化的方法对理解人来说是不够的。作为一位治疗师,他宣称,心理治疗师必须努力领会理解病人的世界,就像病人所体验到的那样。还受到海德格尔关于时间哲学的影响,宾斯万格强调,治疗师应该聚焦于病人当前在治疗中的体验上。而虽然他同意弗洛伊德的本能理论,但他提出,过去仅仅是在关系到当前这个病人时才有关系。从根本上来说,宾斯万格关注的是理解病人显现于意识当中的当前的体验,因而,他的分析目标就是,揭露出在每个病人各自定义的意义情景中由病人所解释的那些现象的结构。

Like Binswanger, Medard Boss worked at developing a critical synthesis of Heidegger and Freud. However, compared to Binswanger, Boss' Daseinsanalysis is, in many ways, a more sophisticated and rigorous development of an ontic human science psychology with its foundation in Heideggarian ontology. Boss' goal from the very beginning involved a radical humanization of medicine and psychology with such a new existential foundation, and his life-work involved a persistent articulation of both the theoretical and practical implications of such an endeavor. As such, Boss' existential-phenomenological approach to psychology shows the possibility for the emergence of human science-oriented medicine and psychology which mirrors Heidegger's polemic against Cartesian dualism -- the splitting of man into res cogitans ("mind") and res extensa ("matter"). Boss' contribution includes an existential analytic of human embodiment such that the human being is understood as a bodying-forth of possibilities in the world with others and alongside things, and, thus, overcomes the Cartesian body-mind split. While Boss is often critical of Freud, his work is, in many ways, well-integrated with psychoanalytic thought and, in fact, opens a potential paradigm by which psychoanalysis is able to overcome many of the epistemological difficulties which have plagued psychoanalytic theory from the very beginning.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) is notable for his groundbreaking work toward developing a post-Cartesian, existential understanding of perception and embodiment. A long-time colleague of Sartre (they co-edited Les Temps Moderns), Merleau-Ponty's work is in many ways more rigorous, graceful and sophisticated than Sartre's more popular writings. For Merleau-Ponty a post-Cartesian psychology depends on an understanding of perception as the primary function of the human organism such that human embodiment constitutes the only adequate foundation for a theory of perception. Merleau-Ponty's work is, in many ways, the crowning achievement of the existential-phenomenological tradition in that he develops a coherent and compelling body of work which overcomes the metaphysical problems of a modernist psychology through his analysis of perception, embodiment, intersubjectivity and language. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is particularly ripe for a developing dialogue between existential-phenomenology and psychoanalysis; unfortunately, he died before he had truly come into his own as a cutting-edge continental philosopher. On phenomenology and psychoanalysis, Merleau-Ponty wrote:

像宾斯万格一样,迈达尔德·博斯(Medard Boss)从事的是发展一套海德格尔与弗洛伊德的重要的综合体。然而,与宾斯万格相比,博斯的此在分析在许多方面,是对实际存在的人文科学心理学的更深奥、更严格的发展,这种发展在海德格尔的存在论中有它的基础。博斯最开始的目标包括,伴随着这样一个新的存在主义基础,将医学与心理学进行根本性的人道化。而他毕生的工作涉及对这一努力的理论及实际意义进行持续阐述。同样,他的存在主义现象心理学方法表明可能出现以人文科学为导向的医学与心理学,它们反映了海德格尔反对笛卡尔二元论——将人分裂成“头脑” ("mind")和“事件” ("matter")——的辩论。博斯的贡献包括对人的具体化进行存在主义分析,因此人的存在被理解为是世界上与他人及身边的东西发生可能性的象征,因而胜过笛卡尔的身心化分。虽然博斯经常批判弗洛伊德,但他的成果在许多方面仍然与精神分析思想良好结合,而且事实上也展现了一个潜在的范式。通过这个范式,精神分析能够克服许多从最开始就一直折磨精神分析理论的认识论难点。

莫里斯·梅洛—庞蒂(Maurice Merleau-Ponty,1908-1961)因发展了对感知与具体化的后笛卡尔哲学的存在主义的理解这一极富创造力的成果而著名。作为萨特的长期的同事(他们共同编辑了《摩登时代》),梅洛—庞蒂的成果在许多方面都比萨特的极流行的作品更严格、更优美、更深奥。对他来说,后笛卡尔心理学依赖于将感知理解为人体组织的初级功能,因此人的具体形象构成了感知理论唯一恰当的基础。梅洛—庞蒂的成果在许多方面都是存在主义-现象学传统最高的成就,因为他发展出了一套连贯又引人注目的成果主干。通过他对感知、具体化、互为主体、语言的分析,克服了现代心理学的形而上学的一些问题。他的哲学特别适合在存在主义-现象学与精神分析之间进行发展性对话;不幸的是,他在真正认可自己是前卫的欧洲哲学家之前就去世了。关于现象学与精神分析,梅洛—宠蒂写道:
 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-25 15:52 | 显示全部楼层

"Phenomenology brings to psychoanalysis certain categories, certain means of expression that it needs in order to be completely itself. Phenomenology permits psychoanalysis to recognize 'psychic reality' without equivocation, the 'intra-subjective' essence of morbid formations, the fantastic operation that reconstructs a world on the margin of, and counter to, the true world, a lived history beneath the effective history -- a world called illness. Freudian thought, in turn, confirms phenomenology on its description of a consciousness that is not so much knowledge or representation as investment; it brings to phenomenology a wealth of concrete examples that add weight to what it has been able to say in general of the relations of man with the world and of the interhuman body. Phenomenology and psychoanalysis, in mutual encounter, would lead us toward a philosophy delivered from the interaction between substances, toward a 'humanism of truth' without metaphysics..."

He goes on to say:

"[However], the accord of phenomenology and of psychoanalysis should not be understood to consist of phenomenology's saying clearly what psychoanalysis has said obscurely. On the contrary, it is by what phenomenology implies or unveils in its limits -- by its latent content or its unconscious -- that it is in consonance with psychoanalysis...Phenomenology and psychoanalysis are not parallel; much better, they are both aiming toward the same latency."

As William J. Richardson (1980) has pointed out, Heideggerian phenomenology and psychoanalytic theory both are "aiming toward the same latency," as Merleau-Ponty has said. In particular, Richardson shows how Lacanian psychoanalysis and Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology aim toward this same unconscious or latency. Most importatnly, both Heidegger and Lacan adhere to Saussure's distinction between language (la langue) and speech (la parole).

Richardson writes:

"For Saussure, language is a self-contained system of signs, a species-specific, semiotic code that may be clearly disengaged from any use in speech that may be made of it and thus become the object of rigorously scientific investigation. Levi-Strauss transposes this concept into a different key and speaks of the 'symbolic order,' the order of signs that sets the pattern (establishes the law) for all human relationships, and, he, too, conceived this to be the appropriate object of scientific inquiry. When Lacan, then, speaks of language as 'structure and limit of the psychoanalytic field' (1977, p. 56) and describes this field, following Levi-Strauss, as the 'symbolic order,' we are invited to infer that this was an extrapolation from Saussure's linguistics through the sphere of anthropology to the field of psychoanalysis.



正如威廉·J·理查森(William J. Richardson,1980)所指出的那样,海德格尔的现象学与精神分析理论都是如梅洛·庞蒂所说的那样,是“针对相同的性潜伏期”。尤其是,理查森说明拉康主义的精神分析与海德格尔的解释现象学是如何将目标对准同样的潜意识或性潜伏期的。最重要的,海德格尔与拉康都赞同索绪尔(Saussure)关于语言和言语之间的差别。



As such, then, the symbolic order would be essentially an object, however much deeper and more comprehensive than other objects, hence a being, something that is. In that case, one would have to admit that language conceived in this way as unconscious is radically different from Heraclitus' Logos when interpreted by Heidegger as aboriginal Language. The difference is as radical as the difference between beings and Being, as the ontological difference itself. It this is the proper way to understand the matter, we would have to say that what Heidegger offers Lacan is the opportunity to think the problem of language in the ontological dimension that grounds his own ontic experience of it -- to mediate the 'unapparent,' 'unavoidable' yet 'inaccessible' content that makes all scientific effort, hence structuralism itself, possible." (from Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, Fall 1980, p. 16).

With this formulation, Richardson implies that psychoanalysis may be ontologically grounded in the hermeneutic of Dasein, who is always a being-in-the-world through the existential modes of being-with, understanding and speech. In particular, this project is particularly fertile for Richardson in three ways. In the first place, Heidegger's understanding of the human kind of being is a being which is radically historical -- a being who is 'authentic' when taking up his or her history as his or her's ownmost history (facticity) which opens toward one's ownmost possibilities. Richardson (1980) writes:

"...in psychonalysis the subject 'assumes' his own history. We take this to mean that he 'takes it over,' makes it his 'own,' 'owns' up to it. This implies the prior discovery of the past for what it is -- not necessarily for what it is in 'reality but for what it is in 'truth,' for 'in psychoanalysic anamnesis, it is not a question of reality but of truth' (Lacan, 1977, p. 48). But how is this 'truth' discerned? By rendering it present in the analytic dialogue, 'because the effect of full speech is to reorder past contingencies by conferring on them the sense of necessitites to come, such as they are constituted by the little freedom through which the subject makes them present' (Lacan, 1977, p. 48). Hence, the "truth" of the past is discerned by letting a 'sense' become manifest in the present. In other words, 'what we teach the subject to recognize as his unconscious is his history -- that is to say, help him to perfect the present historization of the facts that have already determined a certain of the historical 'turning points' in his existence' (Lacan, 1977, p. 52). But this rendering present of the past includes the functioning of the future as well, for the 'analysis can have for its goal only the advent of true speech and the realization of the subject of his history in relation to a future' (Lacan, 1977, p. 88)....The structures most helpful to Lacan would be those of the historicity of Dasein achieving its authenticity with regard to its past by the process of re-thrive, i.e., by thinking-upon-the-past in authentic dialogue: letting the future come again through what has been and rendering it present, i.e., letting its 'sense,' its 'truth' become manifest in and through the mutual exchange." (Ibid, p. 18)



 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-25 15:53 | 显示全部楼层

Secondly, Richardson asserts the vital point that "this constitution of the subject's history takes place in and through the speech 'addressed to the other...' In the collective dialogue, it is the letting-appear of the spoken word that liberates, that heals. And not just spoken word but word as spoken to the other." (p. 18). As radically being-with, the human being shares his or her speech with others, and healing, therefore, takes place in the shared speech of client and therapist which shows itself as a shared truth.

Lastly, Richardson demonstrates that the Heideggarian understanding of "truth" (Aletheia) is essential for a hermeneutic phenomenological thinking of the "talking cure." He writes:

"The process of logos as legein, letting appear, is also a letting truth come to pass. For truth is originally a-le-theia, where lethe means hiddenness and the alpha privative suggests privation, like the removal of a veil of darkness. To let appear, then, means to let being emerge into light as what they are, to liberate them from hiddenness, free them from darkness unto themselves, let them be true. Truth, then, is liberating, 'makes us free.' But it also makes us 'whole,' for when Holderlin speaks of Being as the 'Holy' (das Heilige), Heidegger interprets this to mean that Being in its ineffable bounty makes whole (heil); it is therefore wholesome (das Heile); it is a making whole, a healing (heilen)." (Ibid, p. 19)

In short, the "talking cure" is healing in that it listens to the Saying of Being in language (as opposed to speech) such that the 'truth' may show itself and, in turn, one retrieves one's past (as having-been) in the service of the future (as coming-toward) in the present (as waiting-toward). Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology and psychoanalysis are not at all at odds, but, in fact, inform one another.

The movement of existential-phenomenological psychology has been largely carried on by the "Duquesne school" at Duquesne University. The initial impetus for the Duquesne psychology program came from Rev. Henry Koren, a member of the Holy Ghost Fathers who resided as a faculty member in Duquesne's philosophy department, who first introduced Duquesne psychology students to a series of lectures in phenomenological psychology. It was the Dutch Holy Ghost Father, Adrian Van Kaam, however, who took the vital steps to make Duquesne's existential-phenomenological psychology program a reality. Van Kaam, who joined the Duquesne psychology faculty in 1954, felt the need for such a program in a climate in which the "third force" movement had only just begun to blossom and in which the psychological community had only begun, with thinkers such as Gordon Allport, Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow, to reflect on the problems of the excessive influence of positivist philosophy on American psychology. Van Kaam saw the potential in existential-phenomenology to heal the fragmentation within the discipline of psychology, as he wrote in 1959:

"The newly emerging anthropological psychology intends to fulfill the need for synthesis, integration, and theoretical depth in the many vastly expanding fields of knowledge about man. The awareness of the necessity of this kind of function in psychology has been increased considerably by the growth of existential-phenomenology.



“逻各斯的过程就像说话(legein)、letting appear一样,也是一个发生的出租真理。由于真理最开始是a-le-theia,在这里lethe是隐藏的意思,而第一个字母缩写意思是匮乏,就像除去了黑暗的面纱一样。然后,呈现就意味着让存在现于阳光之下,就像他们本来就出现于阳光之下一样;把它们从隐藏中解放出来,使他们从黑暗中解放出来;让他们成为真实;那么,真理是解放,是‘使我们自由’但它也使我们‘完整’,因为当荷尔德林(Holderlin)将存在视为‘神圣的东西(das Heilige)’谈论时,海德格尔将此解释为,在不能言说的奖励中的存在就获得了完整(heil);因此它是有益健康的(das Heile);它是发展的整体,是康复”。(同上,19页)


存在主义-现象心理学运动主要是由德奎斯尼大学的“德奎斯尼学派”持续开展的。德奎斯尼心理学课程的最初推动力来自Holy Ghost Fathers成员之一的Rev. Henry Koren,他是德奎斯尼哲学系的一名教职员工,率先向德奎斯尼的心理学学生开讲了一系列关于现象心理学的讲座。然而,正是荷兰的Holy Ghost Father,即Adrian Van Kaam,采取了关键的几步,使德奎斯尼的存在主义现象心理学课程得以实施。Van Kaam在1954年成为德奎斯尼心理学教职员工。他认为,“第三势力”运动刚刚开始繁荣,而且心理团体也在刚刚开始,在这样的氛围中,有必要开设这样一门课程,与一些思想家(如奥尔波特、罗杰斯、马斯洛)一起思考一些美国心理学中积极哲学的过多影响问题。Van Kaam看到了存在主义-现象心理学恢复心理学学科中的支离破碎问题的潜力,正如他在1959年写的那样:


Existential-phenomenology's concentration on man's being and acting has made various psychologists aware of the need to understand in their deepest meaning the manifold findings, theories and terminologies of the numerous schools of philosophy, psychology, and psychiatry in different cultures and to keep integrating them in an open, continuously growing and changing Gestalt. This task of anthropological psychology may be compared with the task of meta-biology in the biological disciplines and the rise of theoretical physics in the physical sciences."

The tradition begun by Van Kaam has resulted in over a generation of work toward integrating a human science psychology from an existential-phenomenological perspective. This tradition has included the work of faculty such as Anthony Barton, Constance T. Fischer, William F. Fischer, Amedeo Giorgi, Richard J. Knowles, Charles D. Maes, Edward L. Murray, Paul Richer, David L. Smith, Rolf Von Eckartsberg, Michael Sipiora, Eva Simms, Russ Walsh, Roger Brooke, and Martin Packer. The tradition has continued with increasing emphasis on a dialogue with post-structuralist thought with faculty such as Suzanne Bernard and Lacanian scholar, Bruce Fink. This tradition has extended its influence to programs at the University of Dallas, Saybrook University, Fordham University, Seattle University, State University of West Georgia, BrighamYoung University and Pacifica, to name a few. Duquesne graduate and University of West Georgia faculty member, Christopher Aanstoos, resides as President of the American Psychological Association's division of Humanistic Psychology and is editor of Humanistic Psychology. Scott Churchill, faculty at the University of Dallas, edits Methods. Steen Halling and Georg Kunz, along with James Risser, have been instrumental in the development of a phenomenological-oriented psychology program at Seattle University, and, further, have both furthered scholarship into the contributions of Emmanuel Levinas for the tradition. Bernd Jager carries on the Duquesne tradition at the University of Quebec in Montreal and Fred Wertz does so at Fordham University in New York City, as well as editing the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology. Robert Romanyshyn has been especially instrumental in developing an accessible and rich phenomenological psychology which addresses the fundamental problems of psychology in a technological culture -- and his work has carried on at Pacifica after many years at the University of Dallas, where he provided an organic influence upon the emergence of James Hillman's Archetypal psychology. Other Duquesne graduates include James Brennan, Paul Colaizzi, Robert Coufal, Michael DeMaria, Eric Dodson, Robert Fessler, Edwin Gantt, Mark Johansson, Anne Johnson, Stanton Marlan, Donald Moss, and Robert Sherry, to name a few, all of whom continue in their post-graduate work to contribute to the tradition of existential-phenomenological psychology. This is a tradition which I am proud to belong -- as a current and future proponent of existential-phenomenological psychology and as a student of Duquesne's doctoral program in Clinical Psychology-- and a tradition which I endeavor to continue, along with the help of my co-editors and staff at Janus Head: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature, Continental Philosophy, Phenomenological Psychology, and the Arts (which I co-edit with Victor Barbetti and Claire Cowan-Barbetti).


由Van Kaam开创的这一传统导致一代人从存在主义-现象学的观点努力对人文科学心理学进行整合。这一传统还包括一些教职员工(如Anthony Barton、Constance T. Fische、William F. Fischer、Amedeo Giorgi、Richard J. Knowles、Charles D. Maes、 Edward L. Murray、Paul Richer、David L. Smith、 Rolf Von Eckartsberg、Michael Sipiora、Eva Simms、Russ Walsh、Roger Brooke、Martin Packer)的工作。它越来越强调与后结构主义思想(由Suzanne Bernard 、Lacanian scholar、 Bruce Fink教职人员组成)进行对话。它还将影响扩展到以下这些学校的课程:达拉斯大学、赛布鲁克大学、Fordham大学、西雅图大学、西佐治亚州立大学、杨柏翰大学,仅以这些为例。迪尤肯研究院及西佐治亚大学教职人员Christopher Aanstoos,他是人本主义心理学美国心理协会分会的主席,而且是《人本主义心理学》的编辑。达拉斯大学职工Scott Churchill对方法进行了修订。Steen Halling 、Georg Kunz以及James Risser都对西雅图大学以现象学为导向的心理学课程有帮助。甚至,他们为对这一传统做出贡献的埃马纽埃尔•勒维纳斯设了奖金。Bernd Jager在加拿大蒙特利尔的魁北克大学继续开展德奎斯尼传统,而Fred Wertz除了编辑《现象心理学杂志》外,也在纽约的Fordham大学做着开展德奎斯尼传统的工作。Robert Romanyshyn对发展容易理解又丰富的现象心理学特别有帮助。现象心理学集中于在科技文化中的心理学基本问题,而他的工作在美国达拉斯大学开展了许多年后,又一直在Pacifica开展。在达拉斯大学时,他对詹姆士·威廉的原型心理学提供了基本影响。其他德奎斯尼研究生包括James Brennan、Paul Colaizzi、Robert Coufal、Michael DeMaria、Eric Dodson、Robert Fessler、Edwin Gantt、Mark Johansson、Anne Johnson、Stanton Marlan、Donald Moss、和Robert Sherry,仅以这些为例。所有这些人都继续进行他们的研究生时期的工作,对存在主义-现象心理学传统做出了贡献。我以属于这一传统而感到骄傲——作为存在主义-现象心理学现在及未来的支持者,以及作为临床心理学德奎斯尼博士课程的一名学生,而且在《Janus Head》——对文学、欧洲哲学、现象心理学与艺术等各学科研究的杂志(我与Victor Barbetti、 Claire Cowan-Barbetti合作主编)的我的合作编辑和员工的帮助下,我努力继续做这一传统。
 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-25 15:54 | 显示全部楼层

The traditions of psychoanalytic theory and existential-phenomenology, I would argue, are closely related. I do not think it is a coincidence that Husserl's turn to the life-world and Wittgenstein's turn to everyday language games emerge concurrently with the birth of psychoanalysis. Like phenomenology and the linguistic tradition, psychoanalysis can be understood as a movement toward returning the human being to the world and to language, which, as Martin Heidegger has shown, are deeply intertwined.

As Robert Romanyshyn (1990) has pointed out, both phenomenology and psychoanalysis are related to a fundamental rejection of the "style of vision," the "way of experiencing the world" characterized by the new physics of nature and the new physiology of the body of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. Such an experiencing of the world, per Romanyshyn, is exemplified by linear perspective as the metaphor of the seeing eye as a camera became literalized -- a vision which allows for the Cartesian cogito's primacy over the social and historical dimensions of existence. And, in general, the modern paradigm, which gives primacy to deductive reasoning over the rhetorical, is, on the whole, characterized by the general literalization of its metaphorical activity. In the case of phenomenology, there is a move to return "humanity to the world from that distance, infinite in the ideal, from which we practice a scientific vision." To do so, one must de-literalize the metaphors which give rise to such a vision. The task of a depth psychology, then, is such a de-literalization of the image.

As Romanyshyn (1990) writes:

"Psychoanalysis has sensitized us to our own multiplicity. It has cautioned us never to assume the who or the what of experience. It has taught us to suspend the claim of the ego to be the locus of action and to suspend the claim of the past to be an empirical history. As a science of remembering, it brackets the prejudice of the ego as the agent of psychology life, and the prejudice of fact...as the datum of psychological life. In doing so it recovers the multiple figurations of psychological life...; it also recovers the historical past as an imaginal story that one creates or makes in re-membering it as much as it is a story already made, waiting to be discovered."

In this sense, both phenomenology and psychoanalysis are a cultural therapeutics: an effort to return the subject to the world -- and, ultimately, to the breadth and depth of being-in-the-world.

See: The Psychology-Rhetoric Relationship: A Brief Historical Sketch by Brent Dean Robbins

The many people who have contributed to existential-phenomenological psychology has been too numerous to credit here. Some of those names who have been neglected, but which may be further explored by following the link to their pages, can be found here.

See my on-line writings for more detailed applications of existential-phenomenology to psychological theory and practice.

 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-25 15:57 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 作者 于 2006-2-25 15:57:56 编辑


Carl Jung (1875-1961) is truly one of the great minds of psychology. As mentioned above, Jung was a close colleague of Freud -- in fact, Freud himself considered Jung to be his theoretical heir, thus casting himself in a father-like role with Jung as the crowned prince of psychoanalysis. With Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex, he should have known better, for their Oedipal rivalry led to a harsh and traumatic split. Jung, it seems, had gone too far afield in his reconceptualization of Freud's original insights. Yet, these very insightful innovations of Jung were truly brilliant, foreshadowing the "third force" movement in psychology. In many ways, Jung can be considered the 'father' of humanistic and transpersonal psychology.

Along with Freud's "personal unconscious," Jung felt that he had discovered evidence for a "collective unconscious" shared by all human beings. While the personal unconscious is organized by complexes (i.e., Oedipal complex), the collective unconscious is characterized by "archetypes," "instinctual patterns of behavior and perception," which can be traced in dreams and myths. Joseph Campbell, influenced by Jung, traced archetypal patterns in the mythologies of all cultures. Jung, in general, placed less emphasis on the sexual drives, since he felt the unconscious is driven by the process of "individuation," a drive toward wholeness and balance between the contrary forces of the psyche through the "transcendent function." Like the humanistic psychologists would argue, Jung felt that the unconscious is also a source of health and vitality rather than simply pathological forces. However, Jung also felt that the unconscious holds the potential for evil as well as good.

For Jung, the structures of the psyche are organized by unseen archetypal forces. He used many of the same terms as Freud, such as ego and unconscious, but they hold a different meaning when considered in the light of Jung's whole theory. The major structures of the psyche for Jung include the ego, which is comprised of the persona and the shadow. The persona is the 'mask' which the person presents the world, while the shadow holds the parts of the self which the person feels ashamed and guilty about. In men, the anima represents the feminine aspects of the psyche, while the animus represents the masculine aspects of the psyche in women. The whole of the archetypal organization of the person, for Jung, is called the Self, the unity of the whole towards which the individuation process strives for balance and harmony.

Of the followers of Jung in the Analytic psychology tradition, one of the most influential and innovative has been Marie-Louise von Franz.



运用弗洛伊德的“个人无意识”,荣格感到,他已经发现了所有人类共有的“集体无意识”的证据。个人无意识是由一些情结(如俄狄浦斯情结)组成的,而集体无意识是以一些“原型”、“行为与感知的本能模式”为特征的,这些原型和本能模式可以在梦与神话里找到。受到荣格的影响,约瑟·坎贝尔( Joseph Campbell)探索了各种文化的神话里的原型模式。一般而言,荣格很少强调性驱力,因为他认为无意识是受“个性形成”的过程驱动的,这是一种通过“超越功能”在心理的两种相反力量之间达到完整和平衡的驱力。像人本主义心理学家也许会提出的那样,荣格认为这种无意识不仅仅是导致病理的力量,更是健康与活力的源泉。然而,荣格也认为它既拥有善良的潜能,还拥有邪恶的潜能。


在荣格的分析心理学传统信徒中,最具有影响力和创新性的一个就是玛丽一路易斯·冯·弗朗兹(Marie-Louise von Franz)。

 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-25 16:00 | 显示全部楼层


James Hillman's Archetypal Psychology is inspired by Jung, yet Hillman, in the spirit of Jung himself, moves beyond him to develop a rich, complex, and poetic basis for a psychology of psyche as "soul." In my opinion, Hillman's writings are of the most innovative, provocative and insightful of any psychologist this century, including Freud himself. What makes Hillman's work so important is its emphasis on psychology as a way of seeing, a way of imaging, a way of envisioning being human. His work is truly originary and involves a radical "re-visioning" of psychology as a human science. Hillman's roots are mostly classical, but in the service of retrieving what has been lost to psychology and, thus, in the service of psychology's future in the service of "psyche" or "soul." The power of Hillman's thought, however, has more to do with how he approaches phenomena rather than what he has to say about it. Soul-making is a method, a way of seeing, and this cannot be forgotten. Hillman's roots include Renaissance Humanism, the early Greeks, existentialism and phenomenology. His thought is rhetorical in the best sense of the word; thus, imaginative, literary, poetic, metaphorical, ingenius, and persuasive. If nothing else, one cannot read Hillman without being moved.

Hillman's work is "soul-making" and, in this sense, psychological (the "logos" of the "psyche") in the truest sense of the word. Hillman listens to the saying of the soul, and it speaks in his writing through him. Of Hillman's use of the term "soul," Thomas Moore writes:

"Hillman likes the word for a number of reasons. It eludes reductionistic definition: it expresses the mystery of human life; and it connects psychology to religion, love, death, and destiny. It suggests depth, and Hillman sees himself directly in the line of depth psychology, going all the way back to Heraclitus, who observed that one could never discover the extent of the soul, no matter how many paths one traveled, so profound in its nature. Whenever Hillman uses the forms psychology, psychologizing, and psychological, he intends a reference to depth and mystery."

For Hillman, "soul" is about multiplicity and ambiguity, and about being polytheistic; it belongs to the night-world of dreams where the lines across the phenomenal field are not so clearly drawn. Soul pathologizes: "it gets us into trouble," as Moore writes, "it interferes with the smooth running of life, it obstructs attempts to understand, and it seems to make relationships impossible." While spirit seeks unity and harmony, soul is in the vales, the depths.


詹姆斯·希尔曼(James Hillman)的《原型心理学》是受到荣格的启示。然而本着荣格自己的精神,希尔曼远远超过了他,为作为“灵魂”的心灵心理学发展出了一个丰富、复杂又充满诗意的基础。以我的观点,希尔曼的作品是20世纪任何心理学家(包括弗洛伊德)的作品中最具有创新性、煽动性与洞察力的。希尔曼的成果之所以如此重要,是因为强调心理学是观察人的方式、反映人的方式、想象人的方式。他的成果真正是原创,包含把心理学作为人文学科的根本“重新设想”过程。希尔曼的核心主要是经典派的,但是是为了重新找回心理学已失去的东西而服务的,而且也是为了服务于“心灵”或“灵魂”的心理学的未来而服务的。然而,他的思想的力量更多地是与他是如何接近现象有关,而不是与他对此所说的有关。灵魂锻炼是一种方法,是一种观察的方式,而这不能遗漏。希尔曼的思想根基包括文艺复兴时期的人本主义运动、早期的希腊人、存在主义及现象学。他的思想从词语的感觉上来说辞藻华丽,因而富有想象力、文学味、诗意、比喻性、有创造性、有说服力。如果没有其它原因,人们不可能阅读希尔曼的作品而不被感动。




In his magnum opus, Re-Visioning Psychology, Hillman writes of "soul":

"By soul I mean, first of all, a perspective rather than a substance, a viewpoint toward things rather than a thing itself. This perspective is reflective; it mediates events and makes differences between ourselves and everything that happens. Between us and events, between the doer and the deed, there is a reflective moment -- and soul-making means differentiating this middle ground.

It is as if consciousness rests upon a self-sustaining and imagining substrate -- an inner place or deeper person or ongoing presence -- that is simply there even when all our subjectivity, ego, and consciousness go into eclipse. Soul appears as a factor independent of the events in which we are immersed. Though I cannot identify soul with anything else, I also can never grasp it apart from other things, perhaps because it is like a reflection in a flowing mirror, or like the moon which mediates only borrowed light. But just this peculiar and paradoxical intervening variable gives on the sense of having or being soul. However intangible and indefinable it is, soul carries highest importance in hierarchies of human values, frequently being identified with the principle of life and even of divinity.

In another attempt upon the idea of soul I suggest that the word refers to that unknown component which makes meaning possible, turns events into experiences, is communicated in love, and has a religious concern. These four qualifications I had already put forth some years ago. I had begun to use the term freely, usually interchangeably with psyche (from Greek) and anima (from Latin). Now I am adding three necessary modifications. First, soul refers to the deepening of events into experiences; second, the significance of soul makes possible, whether in love or in religious concern, derives from its special relation with death. And third, by soul I mean the imaginative possibility in our natures, the experiencing through reflective speculation, dream, image, fantasy -- that mode which recognizes all realities as primarily symbolic or metaphorical."

Anyone who takes the discipline of psychology seriously should listen closely to what Hillman has to say and mostly to how he says it. Hillman's work has been furthered and popularized in the writings of Thomas Moore. Robert Sardello, Robert Romanyshyn, and Michael Sipiora have all organically contributed to the development of the movement.





任何一个想要真正获得心理学规律的人都应该密切地听听希尔曼所说过的话,主要听听他是如何说的。希尔曼的成果在托马斯·摩尔的作品中得到促进与普及。Robert Sardello、Robert Romanyshyn及Michael Sipiora基本上都对原型心理学的发展作出了贡献。

 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-25 16:06 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 作者 于 2006-2-25 16:13:29 编辑


While Hillman's Archetypal psychology attends to "soul," the vales, transpersonal psychology is concerned with the peaks, "spirit." In general, transpersonal psychologists are concerned with developing a psychology which integrates the wisdom of the world's spiritual traditions. As the term suggests, 'trans'- personal psychology attempts to place the individual within the greater cosmos beyond the self in which he or she is embedded. Like Jung, most transpersonal psychologists feel that religiosity and the "perennial philosophy" speak to a wisdom of the spiritual reality in which we participate and of which we are a part and product. It is an outgrowth of the humanistic movement and is influenced by its forerunner, Abraham Maslow, who felt that "self-actualization" involves a greater awareness of a spiritual dimension to existence.

Brant Cortright has written of eight basic assumptions of transpersonal psychology:

1. "Our essential nature is spiritual."

2. "Consciousness is multidimensional."

3. "Human beings have valid urges toward spiritual seeking, expressed as a search for wholeness through deepening individual, social, and transcendent awareness."

4. "Contacting a deeper source of wisdom and guidance within is both possible and helpful to growth."

5. "Uniting a person's conscious will and aspiration with the spiritual impulse is a superordinate health value."

6. "Altered states of consciousness are one way of accessing transpersonal experiences and can be an aid to healing and growth."

7. "Our life and actions are meaningful."

8. "The transpersonal context shapes how the person/client is viewed."

As Rolf von Eckartsberg and Robert Romanyshyn have emphasized, psychological and spiritual traditions are primarily metaphorical; they describe and organize human experience. Theory, then, is a map which should not be confused with the territory, and yet such maps are necessary for understanding. Transpersonal psyschology then is a way of seeing that is "spiritual", which aims to integrate and to unify, an effort to synthesize many different traditions into one coherent system. This is its strength as well as its weakness. A spiritual way of seeing can often do a disservice to soul-making by neglecting the complexities and ambiguities -- and, above all, the differences -- between such traditions. It tends to paint in broad strokes, which can lead to missing the subtle nuances that give each tradition its unique character and integrity. The good news is that transpersonal approaches are a way to develop a common language for such traditions to dialogue. However, within this framework, there is always a danger of totalizing the "Other" -- that is, Western spiritual assumptions often tend to consume and appropriate other systems to suit its own needs. Thus, we must guard against a transpersonal psychology which can become an intellectual version of the Crusades. A healthy dose of Levinas, particularly as articulated by Alphonso Lingus, helps to remind us of this potential danger of the transpersonal approach.



寇特莱特(Brant Cortright)写出八项关于超个人心理学的基本假设:









正如Rolf von Eckartsberg与Robert Romanyshyn所强调的那样,一些心理与精神传统基本上都是隐喻性的;它们对人的经验进行了描述和组织。因而,理论就是一张地图,它不能被混淆为领土,然而这样的地图对理解来说又是必须的。那么,超个人心理学是一种理解“精神”所在的方式,这种方式旨在进行整合与统一,努力将许多不同的传统综合成为一个连贯的系统,这既是它的弱势也是优势。理解精神所在的方式通常因忽略了它的复杂性与模糊性,以及,最重要的是,忽略了各种传统之间的差异,而对灵魂锻炼造成伤害。超个人心理学倾向于用大手笔进行描述,这可能会导致漏掉一些构成每种传统独特的特征及完整性的不明显的细微差别。令人高兴的是,超个人的方法是为实现这些传统之间的对话而发展出一种共同语言的方式。然而,在这个框架内,总是存在一种覆盖“别的”传统的危险——即,西方精神假设通常倾向于毁灭、篡改其它系统,以满足自己的需要,。因而,我们必须提防超个人心理学变成高智商版的十字军运动。一剂有益于健康的列维纳斯(Levinas),尤其是由Alphonso Lingus联结的那些,帮助提醒我们超个人主义方法存在的这种潜在危险。

The spiritual approach of integrating the many wisdom traditions of the world has its roots, for example, in Aldous Huxley's "Perennial Philosophy" (see my Perennial Philosophy page). Huston Smith has also contributed greatly to this endeavor. Several common ways of understanding spirituality are evident in this approach. For one, there is a tendency to see the spiritual dimension as both transcendent and immanent. There also tends to be an approach to human existence which emphasizes a hierarchy of psychological-spiritual development. Such a hierarchy is viewed from the perspective of a particular cosmology. Huston Smith's cosmology, for example, includes the four dimensions of existence: the territorial (physican senses and mind), the intermediate (psychic), the celestial (personal divine), and the infinite (impersonal divine). Spiritual and psychological health within these systems is typically understood to involve a process of achieving a higher or greater awareness of these realms of existence. In the extreme, this can appeal to a kind of narcissism in which a person believes he or she is "god." A healthy dose of existentialism can help the typical "new ager" from going psychotic from trying to achieve an all-knowing, all-powerful god-like nature -- which is foolish and lacks humility. This is another potential danger of this movement.

An important lesson for transpersonal approaches to psychology comes from Dante as described by Allen Tate. Allen Tate differentiates between the "symbolic imagination" and the "angelic imagination." While the angelic imagination "tries to disintegrate or to circumvent the image in the illusory pursuit of essence," the symbolic imagination "conducts an action through analogy, of the human to the divine, of the natural to the supernatural, of the low to the high, of time to eternity." The symbolic imagination begins within the human place, and through the soul-making of de-literalizing the image, the poet works to show the traces of the Divine in the concrete description of the mundane. The poet who imagines symbolically cultivates the dwelling-place of the human, and she does not mistake herself for a god. With the imaginative description of the thing, the poet both witnesses and participates in the dance, and she finds herself within a deeper, richer, more human place. The angelic imagination, however, is the mode of understanding that fueled the foolish Tower of Babel project. Tate writes:

"When human beings undertake this ambitious program, divine love becomes so rarefied that it loses its human paradigm, and is dissolved in the worship of intellectual power, the surrogate of divinity that worships itself. It professes to know nature as essence at the same time that it has become alienated from nature in the rejection of its material forms."

Tate reminds us that an approach to the Divine is best served through concrete, poetic, soul-ful articulation of human existence, and the attempt to transcend the human can result in disaster, a project represented in the image of Icarus, who flew too high, too soon, and plummeted to his death.

这种将世界上的各种传统智慧进行整合的精神方法有其根源,比如在阿道司·赫胥黎(Aldous Huxley)的“长青哲学”中(见我的“长青哲学”这一专栏)。休斯顿·史密斯(Huston Smith)也对这一努力做出了巨大贡献。在这种方法中,几种理解精神性的方式是显而易见的。举例来说,存在一种将精神维度看作是超然的与无所不在的这样的趋势。也倾向于是一种强调心理-精神发展层次的人的存在的方法。这样的层次可以从特殊的宇宙论观点中看到。例如,休斯顿·史密斯的宇宙论包含存在的四个维度:领土(医生感觉与头脑)、媒介(心灵)、天国(个人的神父)以及无穷(非个人神父)。这些体系内的精神与心理健康典型地被理解为包含对存在的一些领域获得更高更广泛的认识这样一个过程。如果达到极端,这能够使人达到某种自恋,人就会相信他(她)是“上帝”。存在主义这一健康的药方就能够帮助挽救典型的“新时代人”,避免因努力要达到一种全知、全能、具有上帝一样的本性——这既愚蠢又不够谦逊——而患精神病,这是这一运动的另一个潜在危险。

心理学超个人方法重要的一课来自爱伦·泰特(Allen Tate)描述的《Dante》。爱伦·泰特将“象征想象”与“天使似的想象”做了区分。天使似的想象“试图在虚假追求本质中分裂或围住幻象”,而象征想象“通过类推引导行为,从人到神、从自然到超自然、从低到高、从当时到永远”。象征想像从人所处的位置开始,中间经历了去字义化的幻象的灵魂锻炼过程,诗人在对世俗的描述中表明神的踪迹。进行象征想象的诗人建造了人的住处,她不会误以为自己是上帝。通过对这件事情的想象性描述,诗人就目击并参与到这种舞蹈中,而她发现自己处于一个更深、更丰富、更充满人性的地方。而天使似的想象是一种理解模式,它点燃了愚蠢的巴别塔工程。泰特写道:



 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-25 16:06 | 显示全部楼层

Ken Wilber's spectrum model represents one of the most influential transpersonal models today. Wilbur must be credited as a pioneer who first embarked upon the effort to integrate a theoretical core for a transpersonal approach. One of Wilbur's most interesting and provocative insights is the "pre-trans fallacy." Wilbur argues that traditional psychology has tended to see transpersonal experience as a regression to prepersonal, primitive states of consciousness. He argues, on the contrary, that transpersonal states of consciousness are more mature levels of consciousness which from a personal perspective only appears to be regression.

Michael Washburn has developed a transpersonal model patterned after Jung's analytic approach. Washburn is especially critical of Wilbur's "pre-trans fallacy" argument. For Washburn the pre-personal and transpersonal share with each other the experience of the dynamic, collective, spiritual ground of existence; however, with the transpersonal consciousness, this is expressed through a well-integrated ego. In general, Washburn's approach is from a Western, theistic perspective compared to Wilbur's more nondual, Eastern approach to consciousness. Most importantly, it develops a transpersonal model which does away with the sense of a hierarchy of consciousness in Wilbur's model.

Robert Assaglioli's psychosynthesis theory has had a great influence on the transpersonal movement. Like Wilbur, he argues for a psychology of the height as well as the depths.

Another influence, Hameed Ali's Diamond Approach draws especially from the Sufi tradition which, compared to Jung, Washburn, Wilbur and Assaglioli, places a greater emphasis on the body; however, his concept of "essence" has striking similarities to Jung's concept of the "archetype."

A review of the transpersonal movement in psychology would be incomplete, of course, without mention of Stanislov Grof's Holotropic Model. Grof is known for his work studying the effects of LSD, which helped him to develop his method of therapy as well as a transpersonal theory of consciousness that takes account of spiritual realms of existence.

An exciting outgrowth of the transpersonal movement is the body-centered transpersonal approach, largely influenced by Wilhelm Reich. The many different approaches to transpersonal body-work include: Hakomi, John Pierrakos' Core Energetics, Bodydynamics, the Lomi school, Eva Reich's work, Jack Rosenburg's work, rebirthing, Eugene Gendlin's focusing-oriented psychotherapy, and Charlotte Selver's sensory awareness. (See below under Reichian tradition).

Other influences in Transpersonal psychology include: Otto Rank, Sri Aurobindo, Howard Clinebell, Ram Dass, Meister Eckhart, Riane Eisler, Jack Engler, Mark Epstein, Victor Frankl, Daniel Goleman, St. John of the Cross, Jonn Kabat-Zinn, Jack Kornfield, Krishnamurti, R. D. Laing, Timothy Leary, Wilhelm Reich, Ronald S. Valle, Charles T. Tart, Sri Krishna, Elisabeth Kubler-Ross, Ramana Maharshi, Franklin Merrill-Wolff, David Lukoff, John Nelson, Plotinus, Salvador Roquet, Donald Rothberg, Elbert Russell, Kirk Schneider, Kathleen Speeth, John Suler, Anthony Sutich, St. Teresa of Avila, Chogyam Trungpa, Thich Nhat Hahn, Francis Vaughn, Roger Walsh, John Welwood, Bryan Wittine, Robert Frager, Teilard de Chardin, William James, Susan Schneier, Ralph Metzner, William Blake, Morris Berman Han F. DeWit, Marcea Eliade, Anodea Judith, Sharon Salzberg, D. T. Suzuki, Karlfired Graf von Durckheim, Charlotte Joko Beth, Pema Chodron, A. H. Almaas, Frederick Franck, Natalie Goldberg, Allen Ginsberg, Mildred Chase, Denise Taylor, Eugen Herrigel, Takuan Soho, Carla Needleman, Jeane Martine, Paul Gorman, Karen Kissel Wegela, Stephen Butterfield, Marc David, Stephen Levine, Deena Metzger, Joanna Macy, Ken Jones, Chagdud Tulku, Monica Furlong, Fran Tribe, Dainin Katagiri, Rolf von Eckartsberg and many others.

肯恩·威尔伯(Ken Wilber)的光谱模型代表了当今最具有影响力的超个人模型之一。他应当被誉为是第一个开始努力将理论核心融合为一种超个人方法的创始人。他最令人感兴趣、又具有煽动性的洞察之一是“退化与超越的谬误”("pre-trans fallacy")。他指出,传统心理学一直倾向于将超个人经验视为退行到意识的前个人、原始状态。相反,他提出,意识的超个人状态是意识更成熟的水平,这一水平从个人观点来看,好像就是退行。

Michael Washburn在摹仿了荣格分析方法之后,发展出了一个超个人模型。他特别对威尔伯的“退化与超越的谬误”论点提出批评。对Washburn来说,退化个人与超个人共同分享了存在的动态、集体与精神背景。然而,随着超个人意识的发展,这种分享就通过整合完好的自我表达出来。一般而言,相比于威尔伯关于意识的一元论、更东方化的方法来说,Washburn的方法来自于西方有神论的观点。最重要的是,在威尔伯的模型中发展出了一种超个人模型,在他的模型中,取消了意识的等级感。

Robert Assaglioli的精神综合理论对超个人运动有巨大影响。像威尔伯一样,他既赞同深度心理学,也赞同高度心理学。

另一势力,即汉米·埃力(Hameed Ali)的[钻石方法(Diamond Approach)]特别是由伊斯兰苏非派(Sufi)传统而来。相比于荣格、Washburn、威尔伯与Assaglioli,苏非派更强调身体;而埃力的“本质”的概念与荣格的“原型”概念有惊人的相似之处。

对心理学超个人运动进行回顾时,而不提Stanislov Grof的[全象模型],这当然是不完善的。Grof是以他的研究LSD的影响这一工作知名的,这一工作帮助他发展了意识的超个人理论——考虑了存在的精神领域,也帮助他发展了治疗方法。

超个人运动的一个令人激动的产物就是产生了以身体为中心的超个人方法,这主要是受Wilhelm Reich的影响。许多不同的超个人身体工作方法包括:Hakomi、John Pierrakos的《核心能量学》Bodydynamics, the Lomi school, Eva Reich's work, Jack Rosenburg's work, rebirthing, Eugene Gendlin's focusing-oriented psychotherapy, and Charlotte Selver's sensory awareness. (See below under Reichian tradition).

另外一些影响超个人心理学的人包括: Otto Rank, Sri Aurobindo, Howard Clinebell, Ram Dass, Meister Eckhart, Riane Eisler, Jack Engler, Mark Epstein, Victor Frankl, Daniel Goleman, St. John of the Cross, Jonn Kabat-Zinn, Jack Kornfield, Krishnamurti, R. D. Laing, Timothy Leary, Wilhelm Reich, Ronald S. Valle, Charles T. Tart, Sri Krishna, Elisabeth Kubler-Ross, Ramana Maharshi, Franklin Merrill-Wolff, David Lukoff, John Nelson, Plotinus, Salvador Roquet, Donald Rothberg, Elbert Russell, Kirk Schneider, Kathleen Speeth, John Suler, Anthony Sutich, St. Teresa of Avila, Chogyam Trungpa, Thich Nhat Hahn, Francis Vaughn, Roger Walsh, John Welwood, Bryan Wittine, Robert Frager, Teilard de Chardin, William James, Susan Schneier, Ralph Metzner, William Blake, Morris Berman Han F. DeWit, Marcea Eliade, Anodea Judith, Sharon Salzberg, D. T. Suzuki, Karlfired Graf von Durckheim, Charlotte Joko Beth, Pema Chodron, A. H. Almaas, Frederick Franck, Natalie Goldberg, Allen Ginsberg, Mildred Chase, Denise Taylor, Eugen Herrigel, Takuan Soho, Carla Needleman, Jeane Martine, Paul Gorman, Karen Kissel Wegela, Stephen Butterfield, Marc David, Stephen Levine, Deena Metzger, Joanna Macy, Ken Jones, Chagdud Tulku, Monica Furlong, Fran Tribe, Dainin Katagiri, Rolf von Eckartsberg and many others.

 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-25 16:07 | 显示全部楼层


Buddhist psychology and other Eastern influences have had a profound impact on psychoanalytic thought in general, as well as in Western philosophy. The transpersonal psychologists have been more explicit about its influences, but the influences of Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism are wide-spread today in our intellectual climate. To summarize the influences from the East in this brief forum is simply impossible, for it is a tradition which encompasses another culture's entire spiritual tradition since the dawn of history. Most notably, Abraham Maslow, Carl Jung, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, William James, Aldous Huxley, Alan Watts, Thomas Merton and Joseph Campbell have been core psychological thinkers who were directly influenced by Eastern thought.

For the sake of brevity, I will focus instead on Mark Epstein's Thoughts Without a Thinker, which attempts to describe psychotherapy from a Buddhist perspective. According to Epstein, "Buddhism has something essential to teach contemporary psychotherapists: it long ago perfected a technique of confronting and uprooting human narcissism, a goal that Western psychotherapy has only recently begun even to contemplate." I think this is essential for an understanding of Buddhist psychology and philosophy in general. As I mentioned above, the problem of "perennial philosophy" and transpersonal psychology is the emphasis upon what is common among all spiritual traditions, and, as such, it has often done a kind of violence to the richness and subtlety of the Buddhist doctrines.

In Buddhism, the neurosis which psychotherapy attempts to cure is inevitable. According to the Buddha, the First Noble Truth is that suffering is part of the human condition. As Epstein shows, the Buddha's first insight is that, as human beings, we must be humiliated by the limitations of our bodily existence. "No matter what we do..., we cannot sustain the illusion of our self-sufficiency. We are all subject to decay, old age, death, to disappointment, loss, and disease. We are all engaged in a futile attempt to maintain ourselves in our own image." Rather than escape from this realization, the Buddhist invites the seeker of liberation to contemplate this condition, to deepen one's awareness of our humility through meditative practice. In James Hillman's terms, this is "soul-making." If we are to be happy, says the Buddha, we must first acknowledge that as long as we are attached to the narcissistic ego, we will never come to terms with the oppressive and inescapable humiliations of life.



为了简短起见,相反我会聚焦于非思想家Mark Epstein的思想上,他努力从佛教的观点来描述心理治疗。根据Epstein的观点:“佛教有一些本质的东西可教给当代的心理治疗师:它很久以前就完善了一种面对并根除人的自恋的技术,而这是一个西方心理治疗甚至直到最近才开始思考的目标。”我认为这对从整体上理解佛教心理学与哲学来说是必须的。正如我前面提到的,在关于所有精神传统中的共同点问题上,“长青哲学”的问题及超个人心理学是重点,而同样,这一重点通常也对佛教教义的丰富性与微妙性进行了歪曲。


The Buddha's Second Noble Truth demonstrates, therefore, that the cause of our suffering is attachment to the ego which manifests itself in craving and desire. As Alan Watts has said, this is the desire for permanence in an ever-changing, impermanent existence -- the anxiety in the face of our finitude, as the existentialists would say. It is the attachment to a desire for a stable "identity," one could say. Liberation for the Buddhist, therefore, does not come from a greater or larger self -- an incorporation into a grotesquely indulgent, narcissistic ego which never stops craving -- or even, as Heidegger, Laing or Winnicott would suggest, from the uncovering of a more genuine self, but rather from the lack of a self, or emptiness. This lack is not a craving for lack, however, but rather an absence of craving for either existence or nonexistence -- call it, for the sake of simplicity: acceptance, letting-go, releasement. It is not the craving of eros or thanatos, but rather the absence of craving as emptiness. The Buddha's Third Noble Truth however promises that liberation is possible, and this is articulated by the Buddhas's Fourth Noble Truth. The Buddha's way is the Middle Path, which avoids the extremes of self-indulgence and self-mortification (or, as Epstein translates into psychoanalytic terminology, idealization and denial). Rather, liberation is found in the Eightfold Path: The ethical foundations of Right Speech, Right Action, and Right Livelihood, the meditative foundation of Right Concentration and Right Mindfulness, and the Right View foundation of Right Understanding and Right Thought.

How can one possibly trace the lengthy history of Buddhism in the East and its reception in the West? Or, for that matter, early Taoist and Confucian philosophy prior to Buddhism? Or Hinduism, as well? It is not possible, of course, and, thus, I invite you to explore some of the masters who have introduced such thought to our Western minds:

Alan Watts, Joseph Campbell, Erich Fromm, Arthur Schopenhauer, Joseph Goldstein, Suzuki Roshi, Nyanaponika Thera, Mahasi Sayadaw, A. Sujata, Paul Reps, Walpola Rahula, Nyanatiloka, Tarthang Tulku, Chogyam Trungpa, Thomas Merton, J. Krishnamurti, Jack Kornfield, Stephen Levine, D. T. Suzuki, Sharon Salzberg, Hermann Hesse, Ram Dass, Thich Nhat Han, W.Y. Evans-Wentz, Graham Parkes, J. L. Mehta, Otto Poggeler, Joan Staumbaugh, Paul Shi-yi Hsaio, Neiji Nishitani, Yasuo Yuasa, Akihiro Takeichi, Kohei Mizoguchi, Tetsuaki Kotoh, Hwa Yol Jung, David Michael Levin, Dalai Lama, Lama Thubteu Yeshe, Rodney Smith, Bhikku Nyanasobhano,

因而,佛教的第二真谛证明,我们受难的原因就在于依恋那个在热望与渴望中来证明自己的本我。正如艾伦·瓦茨(Alan Watts)所说,这是在永远不断变化、非永久的存在中渴望永久的渴望——正如存在主义者会说,这是面对我们的有限时的焦虑。也许有人会说,这是一种渴望稳定“身份”的依恋。因此,对佛教徒来说,解放并非来自于更广阔的自己——与永远不会停止热望、过于纵容又自恋的本我结合——甚至,也不是像HeideggerLaingWinnicott提出的那样,来自于暴露更加真实的自我,而更可能是来自于自我的缺乏或空虚。然而,这种缺乏不是对缺乏的热望,而更可能是没有对存在或不存在的热望——简单说,就称它为:接受、释放、放弃。这不是对性的热望,也不是对死的热望,而更可能是没有热望,是空虚。而佛教的第三真谛承诺解放是可能的,而这与佛教的第四谛相结合。佛教的方法是正道(Middle Path),它避免了享乐主义与禁欲主义两个极端(或者按照Epstein译成的心理学术语,是理想化与自制)。更确切地说,解放是在八正道(Eightfold Path)中才能找到的,这八正道分别是:作为伦理基础的正语、正业与正命;作为思考基础的正思、正念;作为正见基础的正定与正精进。


Gomo Tulku, Matthew Flickstein, Jon Kabat-Zinn, Lama Surya Das, Janet Gyatso, Maurice Walshe, Bhante Henepola Gunaratana, Steve Hagen, Bernie Glassman, Thinley Norbu Rinpoche, Jan Chozen Bays, China Galland, Pat Enkyo O'Hara, Joe Loizzo, Stephen Butterfield, Allen Ginsburg, Jack Kerouac, Pema Chodron, Charlotte Joko Beth, Diana St. Ruth, Stephen Batchelor, Jeffrey Rubin, Robert Thurman, John Daido Loori, Allan Bennett, Stephen Prothero, Daniel Goleman, Ursula K. Le Guin, James H. Austin, Robert Aitken, Larry Rosenberg, Natalie Goldberg, Gary Snyder, Peter Mathiessen, Joanna Macy, Yvonne Rand, Reb Anderson, David Whyte, Ed Brown, and many more.

 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-25 16:08 | 显示全部楼层


Heinz Kohut (1923-1981) developed his Self Psychology theory with influences from ego psychology, object relations theory, and humanistic psychology, but, for the most part, his insights were derived from his initial work with patients with narcissistic disorders. Kohut works as a therapist in a way that is actually very phenomenological. Using what he calls "empathic immersion" and "vicarious introspection," Kohut endeavors to understand the experience of the patient from the patient's point of view rather than from the perspective of dogmatic psychoanalytic categories. In doing so, like Rogers, Kohut made empathy the most central and vital ingredient of his work with patients. Using this approach, Kohut came to develop a sensitivity to the experience of the narcissistic patient. He saw in the narcissistic the exuberance, vitality and expansiveness of the child, not mere regression, and he took great pains to preserve the patients healthy sense of omnipotence; in fact he utilized it to bolster the fragile ego of the narcissist. And most importantly, this is a process which occurs in the transference between client and therapist which is slow and gradual, yet has powerful and lasting effects.

From this initial work with narcissistic patients, Kohut developed a theory of various types of transference which develop in almost all therapies: mirroring transference, idealizing transference, and alter ego or twinship transference. In each case, the patient is made to re-experience early object relationships within the therapeutic relationship in such a way that the patient is permitted to meet essential, unmet psychological needs from early development. Such an emphasis on the patient re-experiencing as a part of therapy had already been emphasized by Merton Gill, for example. Also, as in the humanistic tradition, Kohut felt that the patient acts from a basic, vital motivation toward growth which is present in the narcissistic omnipotence and idealization, but which, over time, can be adequately frustrated naturally in the therapy without the need for the therapist to overtly frustrate the needs of the client. In this sense, Kohut's work finds an early influence with Winnicott's approach. In short, Kohut's work is, in many ways, the logical conclusion to over a century of research and practice in psychotherapy among all the various schools of thought mentioned above, and, thus, Kohut is in many ways a great synthesizer of various psychoanalytic traditions, as well as being a sensitive, caring, empathic therapist who knew who to learn from his patients.

The work of self psychology has been carried on by theorist-practitioners such as: Daniel Stern, Robert Stolorow, Michael Kahn, Arnold Goldberg, George Atwood, Paul H. Ornstein, Joseph D. Lichtenberg, Martin Gossman, and David Wolf.


与自我心理学、客体关系理论与人本主义心理学势力一起,海因茨·科胡特(Heinz Kohut,1923-1981)发展了他的自体心理学理论。但最重要的是,他的这些洞察来自于他最初的与自恋障碍病人的工作。作为一位治疗师,科胡特实际上是以一种现象学的方式工作的。使用他所说的“共情沉浸”与“替代内省”,科胡特努力从病人的观点(而不是从教条式的心理分析范畴的观点)理解病人的体验。这样做时,科胡特也像罗杰斯一样,将共情视为他对病人的工作中最重要、最关键的因素。利用这种方法,科胡特逐渐发展了对自恋病人体验的敏感性。他在自恋病人中不仅看到了退行,还看到了儿童具有的生气勃勃、活力与想象力,而由于要保护这些病人健康的万能感,他承受了巨大痛苦;事实上,他利用这种万能感支持自恋者的脆弱的本我。而最重要的是,这是在顾客与治疗师之间产生移情时发生的过程,这一过程是缓慢的、逐步发生的,然而却具有强有力的、持续的效果。

从最初对自恋病人的工作中,科胡特发展出了几乎在所有治疗中都会产生的移情的各种类型的理论:镜像移情、理想化移情、另我(或双生)移情。在每个案例中,都以这样一种方式,即允许病人满足早期发展中未被满足的一些关键的心理需要,让病人在治疗关系中重新体验那些早期的客体关系。这种强调对将病人重新体验作为治疗的一部分以前一直也被Merton Gill所强调。同时,正如在人本主义传统中那样,科胡特认为,病人也是按照向着成长这样一个基本、关键的动机而实施行为的,这表现为自恋式的万能感与理想化中。但随着时间的过去,这种万能感与理想化会在治疗中充分自然地受挫,而不需要治疗师刻意阻止顾客的需要。在这个意义上来说,科胡特的成果找到了温可特方法早期的影响。简言之,科胡特的成果在许多方面是上面提到的各个思想流派中长达一个多世纪对心理分析研究和实践的合理的终结。因而,在许多方面,科胡特既是一个明白从他的病人中学习的敏感、充满关怀、共情的治疗师,还是一位伟大的各种心理分析传统的综合者。

一些理论家-从业者一直坚持开展自体心理学工作,他们是:Daniel Stern、 Robert Stolorow、 Michael Kahn、 Arnold Goldberg、 George Atwood、 Paul H. Ornstein、 Joseph D. Lichtenberg、 Martin Gossman和 David Wolf.

 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-25 16:12 | 显示全部楼层


The Frankfurt School was a tradition of continental philosophy which emerged in the mid-1920's and consisted of Leftist intellectuals who formed the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, Germany. The philosophy of the Frankfurt School is "critical theory" in the tradition of Kant and Marx, respectively. Kantian critique is "an analysis of the conditions of possibility and the limits of rational faculties undertaken by reason itself: assuming a self-reflective or 'transcendental' posture, reason analyzes and criticizes itself in the process of world-constituting 'legislating activity'" (Piccone). Critical theorists also integrated Hegelian critique of Kant with an increasing focus on a critique of historical reason. The Marxian element of ideological critique, however, is the major thrust behind the Frankfurt School's critical theory, and, like Marx following Hegel, the critical theorists took issue with Kant's assumption of the given "facticity" and "positivity" of existing sciences. Critical theory is a liberatory movement -- its chief aim is emancipation. In the flowering of the Frankfurt School, psychoanalytic theory became the well-spring which thinkers such as Marcuse, Adorno, and Fromm drew in order to move beyond the limitations of Marxism in the wake of Stalinism. In this sense, the Frankfurt School is the arena in which philosophy first felt the impact of psychoanalysis. For the critical theorists, Freud's theory and practice of psychoanalysis held the promise of liberation, fundamentally, as being in the service of the unconscious -- and this is clearly the promise of Freud in that repression is a social phenomena, and, thus, ultimately political in nature.

While Erich Fromm ultimately ventured away from the circle of Frankfurt scholars, his Neo-Freudian theory remains closely tied to the influence of critical theory. In turn, Fromm returned to psychoanalysis the influences of critical theory even as critical theory became informed by psychoanalysis. Like Freud, Fromm paints a portrait of the human being as torn between nature and the social world. And, following Marx, Fromm also sees the human being as, when most healthy, growing toward balance, growth and liberation rather than imbalance, decay and alienation. In this sense, Fromm is both a Freudian and a socialist humanist, a reflection of his influences from the Frankfurt School. Fromm's major criticism of Freud, however, is Freud's predominate focus on parental influences. Instead, Fromm focused on the influence of society -- of which the parents are also impacted -- upon the child. Fromm's description of neurosis is more accurately understood as 'sociosis,' our personalities shaped by the values of one's culture. It follows, then, that Fromm's psychoanalysis necessarily includes an essential element of social criticism; thus, he expends much energy in critiquing Western society in his work.




Herbert Marcuse remained more closely tied to the original project of the Frankfurt School compared to Fromm. In 1950, he delivered a series of lectures at the Washington School of Psychiatry where, for the first time, he articulated his long-time consideration of Freud's psychoanalytic theory. Karen Horney, incidently, was in the audience at the time. Over the next four years, he wrote his famous Eros and Civilization which secured his place in history as a proponent of the radical left which emerged in the 1960's New Left. Marcuse's work was an integration of Freud, Marx and Hegel, cultivated also by Marcuse's influences from Heidegger's existential-phenomenology, and which was heavily influenced by his colleague, Horkheimer, of the Frankfurt School. Eros and Civilization served less as an overt criticism of Freud as much as a consideration of the place of Freud's thought in the history of Western rationality. As such, Marcuse's evaluation of Freud sought those places of potential liberation in Freud's thinking which were often neglected, or even denied, by Freud himself. Marcuse locates Freud's thought in the historical-philosophical process originally named by Horkeimer and Adorno "the dialectic of Enlightenment." This "dialectic of Enlightenment" consists of a historical movement toward liberation from irrationalism which, ironically, results in a new form of domination in late industrial civilization which undermines itself. In this sense, Freud's theory of psychoanalysis, while in the service of accommodating itself to the actuality of repressive civilization, it also released forces that cannot be contained within the framework of existing ideas and institutions. For Marcuse, Freud's meta-psychology held out the promise of a social and political critique in the service of the instincts -- the id! -- as the incorruptible governors of a realm in which the laws of gratification are rigidly enforced. Like Fromm, Marcuse came to the recognition that "The reality which shapes the instincts as well as their need and satisfaction is a socio-historical world."

Marcuse was critical of Fromm, as well as other neo-Freudians, for giving primacy to secondary, environmental factors; instead, he felt that priority must be given over to the powerful role of the instincts. "Whereas Freud, focusing on the vicissitudes of the primary instincts, discovered society in the most concealed layer of the genus and individual man," Marcuse wrote, "the revisionists, aiming at the reified, ready-made form rather than at the origin of societal institutions and relations, fail to comprehend what these institutions and relations have done to the personality that they are supposed to fulfill." In other words, when a radical, critical theory is in the service of the status quo, it is weakened and rendered ideological. In short, Marcuse provides a compelling argument that psychoanalytic theory holds the potential for a radical social critique in the service of Eros -- a potential, though unrealized, project at the heart of Freud's meta-psychology.

与弗罗姆相比,赫伯特·马尔库塞更接近于法兰克福学派最初的计划。1950年,他在华盛顿精神病学院做了一系列演讲,在那里,他第一次明确说明了他对弗洛伊德精神分析理论的长期考虑的结果。意外的是,卡伦·霍妮当时也在听。在接下来的四年多时间里,他写下了著名的《性欲与文明》(Eros and Civilization),这确立了他作为20世纪60年代出现的新左派激进左派支持者的历史地位。马尔库塞的成果综合了弗洛伊德、马克思与黑格尔的成果,并因他受到来自黑格尔存在主义现象学的影响及法兰克福学派的同事霍克海默(Horkheimer)的巨大影响,而得到改善。因尽可能多地考虑到在西方唯理性历史中弗洛伊德思想的地位,《性欲与文明》较少公开批判弗洛伊德。同样,马尔库塞对弗洛伊德的评价是在弗洛伊德思想中经常被他自己忽略或否定的潜在解放的地方。马尔库塞将弗洛伊德的思想定位于最初由霍克海默及阿多尔诺命名的“启蒙的辩证”的历史-哲学进程中。“启蒙的辩证”是由来自反理性主义的历史解放运动构成的。讽刺的是,这一运动导致在破坏了自身的晚期工业化文明中形成了新的统治形态。在这个意义上,尽管弗洛伊德的精神分析理论是为适应压抑文明的现状服务的,但也释放了一些不能包容于现有的观念与制度中的力量。对他来说,弗洛伊德的元心理学坚持承诺在为本能——本我!它是满意法则需要严格执行领域的正直的统治者——服务进行社会与政治批判。像弗罗姆一样,马尔库塞也承认,“塑造本能及其需要与满意的事实上是社会历史世界。”


Aside from Fromm and Marcuse, other Frankfurt School thinkers include: Max Horkheimer, Otto Kirchheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and Leo Lowenthal.
















Max Horkheimer, Otto Kirchheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and Leo Lowenthal.















发表于 2006-2-26 13:41 | 显示全部楼层
 楼主| 发表于 2006-2-27 09:12 | 显示全部楼层
爱相随eva发表于2006-2-26 13:41:00我这几天在看你这几次发的,由于最近功课有些忙,但是我还是一直在关注着,你翻译的真是不错的。同时也谢谢你的祝福,更愿你在翻译的路上,一切成功……

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